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Book Review 
June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage Markets: How Inequality is Remaking the 
American Family, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 258, $29.95.
Reviewed By Deborah Zalesne and John Guyette 
Why is marriage thriving for high-income, well-educated elites, and dying 
for low-income, less-educated couples? “[I]t’s the economy, stupid,” argue 
authors June Carbone and Naomi Cahn in their thoroughly investigated new 
book Marriage Markets: How Inequality is Remaking the American Family (5). Marriage, 
the authors posit, is a deal similar to other bargains, driven by market forces. 
For some, marriage is a more realistic “deal” to make, and comes with greater 
chances for a successful outcome. Yet for others, marriage is often viewed as a 
deal not worth making. 
Marriage and the modern-day American family have changed dramatically 
over the years. The age at which people marry is going up, the rate of marriage 
is falling, almost half of all marriages fail, and the number of children born 
outside of marriage is on the rise (1). The percentage of children growing up 
in single-parent households is the highest in the developed world (1). Assistive 
reproductive technologies have become more advanced and commonplace, 
and at least 37 states and the District of Columbia have legally recognized 
same-sex marriage.1 
But these changes do not affect everyone the same way. Carbone and Cahn 
specifically suggest that “economic inequality is remaking the American 
family along class lines,” (1) with educated families better able to maintain the 
traditional, stable family model than their less educated and less financially 
secure counterparts. The vanishing “middle”—largely a result of the decline 
in decent-paying blue-collar jobs and mid-level management positions—has 
exacerbated already diverging marriage markets between the rich and the 
poor. The authors explain that “marriage has disappeared from the poorest 
1.  See ProCon.org, http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857, 
(last visited February 17, 2015).
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communities, . . . [and], in a reversal of historical trends, elite women have 
become the most likely to marry” (2). In turn, divorce rates have dropped 
dramatically for the most educated, while continuing to rise for everyone else.2 
In their highly acclaimed previous joint effort, Red Families v. Blue Families: 
Legal Polarization and the Creation of Culture, Carbone and Cahn went beyond 
purely political or value-based divides and examined emerging family models 
through the lens of a rapidly changing post-industrial economy.3 Picking up 
on this theme, Marriage Markets thoughtfully examines the links between 
evolving families, developments in family law, and growing class divisions, 
and highlights the role of class in “scripting our lives” (2). Of course culture 
(including ethnicity, race, sexuality, religion, and citizenship) also plays a 
distinct role in family formations, and can account for family wealth gaps among 
various groups of Americans. For example, the authors reveal how African-
American families were the so-called “canaries in the mine,” early victims of 
social and economic inequality that has only become more widespread (27). But 
the authors’ primary focus is on class (either independently or in intersection 
with culture) as the true catalyst for the growing class chasm among American 
families. The authors illustrate how greater economic inequality together with 
increased participation of women in the labor market remade the terms of 
marriage, divorce, and child-rearing—“[p]ut the two strands together . . . and 
you have the elements of a new family strategy increasingly beyond the reach 
of the working class” (46).
The modern family model rests on a new “social script” that contemplates 
“spousal independence” (93)—but this “elite model of family law” (105) is out 
of reach for many families. Indeed, Carbone and Cahn depict two different 
social scripts that are more or less predetermined based on class. In one script, 
marriage and families thrive. For Tyler and Amy, a middle- to upper-class 
Midwestern couple in their late twenties/early thirties, marriage and having 
kids were in the cards. They met during their second year of law school, got 
married shortly after graduating, and had the benefit of financial support from 
their parents as they transitioned into their professional careers as attorneys. 
Despite accruing debt from law school, the chances that Tyler or Amy would 
ever need public assistance were slim to none. 
In the other script, marriage is less accessible and often viewed as a deal that 
is less than preferable. For Lily, unmarried and four months pregnant, and 
her boyfriend Carl, jobless and living at home with his parents, marriage is 
unlikely. Both struggled financially, and while Lily believed she could handle 
the challenge of supporting herself and her child, the thought of marrying 
2. The authors point out that, although families have always differed by class (the middle and 
elite have always been “more likely than the poor to marry before giving birth, less likely to 
divorce, and less likely to end up at the altar solely because of pregnancy”), the “trend lines” 
were more or less the same regardless of class (15). Starting in the ’80s, however, divorce rates 
started “dropping sharply” for the well-educated, while declining only “modestly,” and at 
some points even rising, for the rest of the population (16).
3. Naomi CahN & JuNe CarboNe, red Families v. blue Families (2011).
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Carl and the prospect of having to support him was too much. Although Tyler 
and Lily grew up near each other, shared the same ethnic heritage, and perhaps 
50 years ago would have led similar lives with similar outcomes, today, the 
authors explain, their lives are dramatically different with respect to future job 
prospects, relationships, and childbearing. 
Throughout their narrative of diverging social scripts, Carbone and Cahn 
portray the family in economic and market-based terms, treating the marriage 
partnership much like any other contract that comes with rights and obligations 
on both sides. Like other market exchanges, married partners trade economic 
responsibility for some degree of financial security. The authors plainly note 
that “relationships do occur as a result of an exchange, just like the purchase of 
the latest iPhone. . . . These exchanges, like other kinds of human interactions, 
also reflect supply and demand” (8). Using market rhetoric, the authors 
explain the real transaction costs and demand curves that bear on our human 
relationships. They put forward the unromantic but highly realistic notion that 
our intimate relationships are deeply driven by economics—when the available 
supply of economically suitable partners is insufficient or marriage imposes 
obligations that they cannot meet, for example, people opt against marriage.
There is perhaps an inherent discomfort in using the language of exchange 
for human commodities, as the authors do, turning “unique individuals 
into fungible entities with monetary values.”4 But the authors’ nuanced 
market-based arguments rightly take into account the distinct qualities of 
intimate relationships, recognizing that they inherently “depend on trust, 
. . . incorporate assumptions about gender, and . . . reflect community 
reinforcement (or obstruction in the case of same-sex couples) of institutions 
like marriage” (8). Those who might object to the commodification of families 
and human relationships in this way should rest assured that the authors’ 
market observations are backed up by in-depth research and solid statistical 
analyses. The authors deftly walk the line of analyzing couples as market 
actors as well as human and emotional actors.
In the most developed and perhaps most novel second section of the book, 
the authors examine the “gender bargain,” or the “terms on which men and 
women find it worthwhile to forge lasting relationships” (2). Whereas in 1960 
the average age of marriage was 20 for women and 22 for men (61-62), today, on 
average, a first marriage occurs at ages 27 and 29, respectively.5 Individuals are 
increasingly investing in career and education before opting for marriage. The 
pill and abortion, the authors note, played a pivotal role in allowing women 
more autonomy over both family and career choices. In the process, these 
technologies have helped redefine marriage markets, expanding the timetable 
4. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 Geo. l.J. 185, 218 (2012) (quoting 
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 harv. l. rev. 1849, 1883-87 (1987)).
5. Kay Hymowitz et al, In Brief, KNot Yet, http://twentysomethingmarriage.org/in-brief/ (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2015).
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for marriage and thus increasing the information available for prospective 
couples thinking about forming families:
Women have achieved a measure of independence. With greater wariness of 
interdependent relationships, both men and women can now go it alone. They 
can live by themselves, choose an intimate partner with no strings attached, 
live with roommates of their choice, or move back in with mom and dad. 
Marriage is optional (124).
There is a lot riding on marriage today. In this “high stakes negotiation” to 
find the best partner, couples consider not only their emotional connection, 
but also the financial realities. For example,
A globe-trotting journalist, male or female, is not likely to marry a restaurant 
owner rooted to one place. This search builds in more uncertainty—the college 
student who plans to make a killing on Wall Street may enjoy better marital 
prospects at thirty-two than at twenty-two but only if he succeeds. The most 
ambitious of the women who may find him attractive will also wait to see how 
both of their lives turn out. Mating and dating have become a higher stakes 
game (43). 
Key to understanding how and why modern-day couples enter into marital 
bargains requires an understanding of the ratios of available men and women 
in a given market. Changing gender ratios reinforce class divides by affecting 
the marital bargains that underlie marriage markets. Just as the supply and 
demand of commodities drive prices, gender ratios are the catalyst behind 
both men’s and women’s choices about whom and whether to marry. 
As the number of women increases beyond the number of desirable men 
(i.e., those who have the educational background and employment status to 
qualify as marriage material) in a particular area or market, the more desirable 
men in the market are free to “play the field” and generally do not have to 
commit in order to have a sexual relationship or to have children. In other 
words, the most eligible bachelors in such markets are less inclined to commit 
to marriage and can afford to wait longer to marry if they choose. Similarly, 
where the number of eligible men is greater in a given market, the most eligible 
women can be choosier before committing to a long-term mate.
Higher-income couples that have college degrees, have started their 
respective careers, and have waited to have children have the benefit of 
choosing among the best marital bargains. They also enjoy a greater likelihood 
of family stability. Meanwhile, both men and women on the lower rungs of 
the economic ladder have far fewer choices when it comes to marriage. For 
women like Lily, with limited choices of marriageable men, the costs of the 
marital bargain may exceed the benefits. The net result of these gender ratios 
is a sharpening class divide. While higher-earning adults tend to marry other 
educated high-income adults, low-income, less educated adults tend either 
not to marry or to marry other similarly situated adults. Couples who pursue 
education and career first and wait to get married reflect and reinforce existing 
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class structures. The elite marry the elite, which in turn creates a “feedback 
loop” of advantages for their children, and reinforces economic inequality 
between families at the top and those at the bottom (87).
Another central component to Carbone and Cahn’s thesis is the role that 
family law plays in reinforcing diverging marriage markets and affecting 
other personal choices people make. Section III richly details how legal 
developments have contributed to the class divide in family life (103-140). 
Despite the existence of two distinct social scripts, the law mirrors only one 
of them. The authors explain how new legal rulings “reflect the assumptions 
of the upper third” while “reject[ing] the contingent arrangements of the 
marginalized groups who have given up on marriage altogether” (110). Shifts 
in family law, while responding to the changing needs of higher-income 
families, simply reinforce for low-income couples the notion that marriage 
offers more burden than benefit. 
Historically, family law has reflected and reinforced patriarchal cultural 
norms, perpetuating defined gender roles, with women being financially 
dependent on their husbands as they raise families together. As women have 
become more autonomous and greater financial contributors, family law 
has slowly responded. The new legal model contemplates shared financial 
and domestic contributions, without distinguishing between the two when 
assessing and measuring relative contributions to the family. The model also 
assumes joint responsibility for finances and child-rearing. Most notably, the 
law has moved toward equal division of property, decreased support awards 
that are limited generally to long-term homemaker, and shared parenting. The 
authors expose how this new “egalitarian family law” works well for high-
earning couples, or couples who make relatively equal marital contributions, 
but tends not to work for lower- and working-class couples, further contributing 
to diverging marriage markets (111).
As the book’s fictional couples move further apart, the law has failed to 
evolve in a way that responds to both couples’ developing needs. Formal 
family law decisions now give voice to the new marital script followed by Tyler 
and Amy, supporting, for example, their possible divorce:
. . . Tyler would automatically be treated as a father. The parties would be 
expected to split their joint assets. Alimony would be rare, particularly after a 
marriage of less than ten years. The judge would ask them to list any children 
born during the marriage and before the court would approve a divorce, it 
would make arrangements for both parents to continue to be involved in the 
children’s lives. . . . If they were to part, the law would reflect the commitment 
they made to each other as an on-going obligation (104).
On the other hand, the authors reasonably conclude that the “mandated 
sharing of assets, children, and lives can be a threat to those whose lives 
are unstable and unequal” (119). If Lily and Carl were to split, for example, 
though the formal law that would apply to them would be the same, it would 
not provide the same mutual benefit as provided to their married counterparts:
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[Formal family law] would apply only if Carl establishes paternity and gets 
himself to court. Lily, proud of her independence, has no duty to identify Carl 
as the biological father or to list him on the birth certificate. If after their child 
is born Carl wants to see the baby, Lily would have no obligation to let him 
do so in the absence of a court order. . . . In the meantime, Carl is most likely 
to have any relationship with the child at all only if he keeps Lily happy—
contributing financially, offering to help with childcare, and staying out of the 
rest of her life. Lily in turn already distrusts Carl and she will be even less likely 
to welcome his involvement if she starts to see another man (105).
The “new elite model of family law” simply makes marriage even less 
attractive for the lower third, who will often prefer to realize their relationships 
on their own terms, limiting the role the law plays in their relationships.
As solutions, in Section IV, the authors’ proffer two strategies: (1) rebuilding 
from the top down, which involves examining the family in the context of 
inequality in employment; and (2) rebuilding from the bottom up, which 
requires directly addressing the needs of children (141-201).
First, rebuilding from the top down requires rebuilding the foundation of 
the middle class through employment and improved labor markets. According 
to the authors, reforming corporate culture, creating stable jobs, reforming 
the minimum wage, and subsidizing job creation, among other means of 
rebuilding employment, will have the result of strengthening the American 
family, so that couples like Lily and Carl can access the more preferable life 
script. 
Rebuilding from the bottom up necessitates “rebuilding the infrastructure 
that supports investment in children from early childhood through early 
adulthood” (143). The authors unveil the growing class gap in children’s 
“cognitive achievements, civic engagement, and athletic participation” (158).
The solution, they say, is greater support for mothers during pregnancy, and 
going forward through early childhood and beyond secondary education. 
“Supporting the next generation means supporting parents” (164). With the 
reintegration of women into the workforce, seventy percent of children now 
live in houses in which all the adults work. To access the more preferable 
life script, these dual-income families must earn enough “to pay others to 
provide childcare and ‘enrichment’ activities” (159). For those who do not, 
this paradigm requires family-friendly workplace reforms such as expanded 
family leave, increased flexibility for parents to use sick leave benefits to care 
for their children, and enhanced work-week flexibility. Additionally, Carbone 
and Cahn advocate for a more flexible family law regime that recognizes and 
adapts to changes in the American family—e.g., same-sex parents, multi-parent 
and stepparent families, non-biological parents, and the like—and thus works 
for all families regardless of social script. 
The authors offer vitally important economic solutions to closing the 
class gap in family formations. One thing they do not take on, however, is 
a critique of the institution of marriage as a legitimate construct in the first 
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place. The authors clearly recognize that the legal parameters of marriage may 
exacerbate the existing class inequity in family structures. Their solutions, 
however, involve reforms such as expanding the social safety net, creating 
better-paying blue-collar jobs, and reforming traditional family law structures, 
without tackling an underlying threshold problem of the state’s involvement 
with intimate relationships and its role in promoting marriage. Although the 
authors critique the existing marriage model, representing it as an exclusive 
institution for higher earners that further entrenches the class divide, they 
still idealize a more egalitarian marriage construct as the sought-after optimal 
outcome. Of course, challenging the entire institution of marriage may be 
beyond the scope of a book that deals thoroughly with the vast inequities in 
the existing framework, and is perhaps better left for another discussion.
Timely, poignant, extremely readable, and highly recommended for any 
Family Law or even Contracts class, Marriage Markets tells the story of what 
has happened to the economics of the American family in a compelling, 
concise narrative supported by rock-solid statistical evidence. Although the 
book has an audience potentially much wider than law professors, the value 
for law faculty cannot be overstated. Marriage Markets brings to light the 
socio-economic factors that underlie many of the family law decisions found 
in the traditional casebook offerings, even when not explicitly acknowledged 
in the cases themselves. Bringing this factual context into the classroom would 
facilitate discussions of class, race, and cross-cultural sensitivity, and allow for 
a more enriching discussion of the cases overall. This book is necessary reading 
for the next generation of law students, who will ultimately play an integral 
part in assuring that family law keeps pace with evolving family norms.
More so than ever, class is the catalyst for diverging marriage markets. To 
help close this chasm, the authors argue for a rethinking of legal and economic 
structures that reflects changing family structures. As the authors plainly state, 
“any analysis or proposed solution that does not take growing inequality into 
account is based on a lie” (5). Indeed, recognizing and acknowledging the 
effects of this inequality on family structures is a critical first step. 
